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  • 2 weeks later...
On 11/28/2016 at 4:08 PM, minast said:

Τσάμπα μεταφορές στο San Francisco λόγω ransomware:

http://news.in.gr/science-technology/article/?aid=1500117512

Τελικά απ' ότι ισχυρίζονται οι υπαίτιοι, η έκταση της παραβίασης στην υποδομή των μεταφορών του SF ήταν τεράστια:

http://gizmodo.com/it-looks-like-the-san-fransisco-muni-hack-was-worse-tha-1789443579?rev=1480374770588&utm_campaign=socialflow_gizmodo_twitter&utm_source=gizmodo_twitter&utm_medium=socialflow

https://www.enisa.europa.eu/news/enisa-news/the-importance-of-cryptography-for-the-digital-society

Quote

ENISA sees that:

  • The use of backdoors in cryptography is not a solution, as existing legitimate users are put at risk by the very existence of backdoors.
  • Backdoors do not address the challenge of accessing of decrypting material, because criminals can already develop and use their own cryptographic tools. Furthermore, new technologies are now being deployed making lawful interception in a timely manner very difficult.
  • Judicial oversight may not be a perfect solution; as different interpretations of the legislation may occur.
  • Law enforcement solutions need to be identified without the use of backdoors and key escrow. It is very difficult to restrict technical innovation using legislation.
  • History has shown that technology beats legislation, and criminals are best placed to capitalise on this opportunity.
  • The perception that backdoors and key escrow exist, can potentially affect and undermine the aspirations for a fully embraced Digital Society in Europe.
  • History has shown that legal controls are not always successful, and may harm and inhibit innovation, as seen with previous US experience.

 

  • Like 2
(edited)

Στο ίδιο πνεύμα περυσινό paperάκι από τεράστια ονόματα του χώρου:

https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/1/1/69/2367066/Keys-under-doormats-mandating-insecurity-by

 

..και συμπεράσματα από Επιτροπή του Κογκρέσου:

https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/20161220EWGFINALReport.pdf

 

Πρόσφατα ήμουν σε συνέδριο και είχα την τύχη να παρακολουθήσω keynote ομιλία του Hellman (you know, όπως λέμε Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol) όπου περιέγραψε πώς η NSA προσπαθούσε να τους φιμώσει όταν με τον Diffie και τον Merkle φώναζαν ότι τα 56bits του κλειδιού το DES ήταν (ήδη τότε) ανεπαρκή.

 

Έγινε επεξεργασία από Shaman

Court of Justice of the European Union:  The Members (sic) States may not impose a general obligation to retain data on providers of electronic communications services

 

Quote

EU law precludes a general and indiscriminate retention of traffic data and location data, but it is open to Members States to make provision, as a preventive measure, for targeted retention of that data solely for the purpose of fighting serious crime, provided that such retention is, with respect to the categories of data to be retained, the means of communication affected, the persons concerned and the chosen duration of retention, limited to what is strictly necessary. Access of the national authorities to the retained data must be subject to conditions, including prior review by an independent authority and the data being retained within the EU.

 

http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-12/cp160145en.pdf

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